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Jeff Kahn

Putin's Federal Reforms A Legal-Institutional Perspective
Happy families are all alike;
every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.
Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina

No one argues that Russian executive power
must be enforced, but what does that have to do
with the rights of the regions? It is impossible
to form a strong family by force; one can do so only
with consent and mutual affection.
Farit Mukhametshin, Chairman,
Tatar State Council, 3 August 20001

On the eve of the new millennium, Tolstoy's description of the state of affairs
at Oblonsky's house seemed an accurate pronouncement on Boris Yeltsin's
federal relationships: everything was in confusion. 2 Federal authority was as
Often openly flaunted as resentfully acknowledged. The eighty-nine presidential
envoys that Yeltsin dispatched to the regions in 1997 to enforce federal law
easily corrupted by the regional authorities on whom they and their
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families depended for housing, education and even their own offices. By 1999
they had been all but forgotten by the federal centre. Yeltsin's regional poli~ •
had regressed from one of hesitant negotiation with a few regional powers to .
incessant deal-making. With each new bilateral deal, Moscow weakened its
power to enforce its will, and muddied the constitutional authority to assert its
rights. The Federation was held together by two unstable forces: personal
agreements between elites (many of whom were in power since Soviet times),
and the economic necessity born of desperate times.
The inauguration of Vladimir Putin led almost immediately to substantial ·
changes for Russian federalism, though no one at the time predicted the reforms
that would spring from the colourless chekist who replaced Sergei Stepashin as ·.
Prime Minister in Fall 1999. Prior to Yeltsin's surprise New Year's Eve resignation,
Putin's regional politics extended to the brutal war he had restarted in Chechnya.
The first year of Putin's presidency, however, proved to be the most concerted
and fundamental shake-up of federal relations in Russia since the 1993 Constitution.
This paper examines this transition in detail, focusing attention on the legalinstitutional aspects of this dramatic shift in policy. First, the end ofYeltsin's
'parade' - of sovereignties, bilateral treaties and special agreements - is examined. Next, attention is paid to Putin's early decrees: 'positive' decrees creating
the seven federal districts and federal envoys, and 'negative' decrees that annulled
regional laws and legal acts judged by him not to be in conformity with federal
law. Finally, I explore Putin's legislative reforms - a three-part package of bills
that altered the composition of the upper chamber of the federal parliament,
the Federation Council (hereafter FC), and the relationship of its former members to the federal president.

Requiem for the Bilateral Treaty Process
Throughout the Yeltsin administration, bilateral treaties (dogovory) and agreements (soglasheniia ), from negotiation to signature, were an exclusively executive
branch activity. Federal and regional legislatures were neither required nor
invited to participate at any stage of the process. Only the signature of presidents
and prime ministers appeared at the bottom of these documents, without any
process of legislative ratification. This omission was deliberate. Struggling to
control both the federal parliament and the regions, Yeltsin's super-presidential
powers could only weaken by adding more players to the negotiation game.
For regional executives, many of whom held their parliaments under thumb,
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ratification by another branch of government was either superfluous or an
unnecessary risk. Past practice in Soviet patron-client relations, in which all of
'the participants had received their political schooling, further encouraged the
personalisation - rather than the institutionalisation - of federal-regional
politics.
Resort to the old patron-client politics, however, placed treaties and
agreements in an ambiguous legal position. Certainly, these documents did
not have the status of federal constitutional law, or even federal law, having
completely circumvented the Federal Assembly. What standing such documents
had in regional law was equally unclear given the absence of any legislative
approval in regional parliaments. Nor could they be considered the equivalent
of federal or regional presidential decrees (ukazy), as these acquire legal force
through official publication, a requirement never established for bilateral
arrangements. Indeed, throughout the 'Parade of Treaties; popular wisdom held
that the most sensitive (and lucrative) deals were purposely kept hidden from
scrutiny.
The highly personalized manner in which treaties and agreements were
concluded created political problems. All forty-seven treaties agreed between
1994 and 1998 were signed by Boris Yeltsin. The vast majority of names on the
other side of the page were those of regional elites who were still in office in
1999. What would happen to these documents when one or both men (and
they were all men) left office? Would they still be accorded the force of law?
Too late, Yeltsin attempted to reform this system. On 30 July 1999, a new
federal law came into force to regulate the bilateral treaty process. 3 Prima facie,
.this law seemed to institutionalise mechanisms for wider participation in the
passage of federal laws dividing issues of joint competency between the
Federation and the regions. The law re-emphasized the supremacy of federal
laws and the RF Constitution in the hierarchy of laws (Art. 3, § l; Art. 4). The
principle of glasnost in drafting and promulgating treaties was also categorically
asserted (Art. 10). Regions were given three years to bring existing treaties and
agreements into conformity with federal law (Art. 32, § 2). Of course, after
Years spent disregarding similar passages in the Federation Treaty, Constitution
and countless federal pronouncements, these old mantras had a hollow ring.
There was no rush to reform.
The empty repetition of fundamental principles belied a more serious lacuna
in the law. A fundamental shortcoming of the new law was the absence of a
stronger role for the Federal Assembly and regional legislatures in the treatytnaking process. The 1999 law did not require the ratification of treaties by
federal and regional legislatures, only examination (rassmotreniia) (Art. 23, §§
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2-4). 4 Lacking any right of refusal, or even redaction, legislatures were _"''''-'Jlt"n
at the negotiating table - best seen, but not heard. 5
Time showed the change to be a superficial one. Yeltsin never signed another
treaty, and Putin, in the first year of his presidency, radically changed the rules
of the federal game with his sweeping package of reforms - a future the
benefactors of this personality-driven process had always feared. From June
1998 through November 2001, no new bilateral treaties or agreements were
signed and no existing ones renewed as deadlines passed. 6 In a speech to the
nation in May 2000, Putin declared, 'I am addressing the lawmakers once again.
Once again I would like to stress that the period of forced compromises leading
to instability is over.' 7 Yeltsin's law on the bilateral treaty process, like the treaties
and agreements that were its target, was left to wither on the vine.

'The Dictatorship of Law'
Early in his presidential campaign, Vladimir Putin introduced a strange phrase
into the political lexicon: 'the dictatorship oflaw: Putin's speeches and writings
on democracy and law were at once encouraging and chilling. His use of
democratic concepts often left unclear in what manner he thought them best
applied:
In a non-law-governed, i.e. weak, state the individual is defenceless and not free. The
stronger the state, the freer the individual. In a democracy, your and my rights are
limited only by the same rights enjoyed by other people. It is on recognising this simple
truth that the law is based, the law that is to be followed by all - from an authority
figure to a simple citizen.But democracy is the dictatorship of the law - not of those
placed in an official position to defend that law.... I know there are many now that are
afraid of order. But order is nothing more than rules. And let those who are currently
engaged in substituting concepts for one another, trying to pass off the absence of
order for genuine democracy- let them, I say, stop looking for hidden dirty tricks and
trying to scare us with the past. 'Our land is rich, but there is no order in it~ they used
to say in Russia. Nobody will ever say such things about us in future. 8

Such statements sent shockwaves through Russia's weak democratic opposition.9 Did the Russian president mean the 'Rule of Law; or a more frightening,
bureaucratised rule through laws? Was Putin's oxymoronic linkage of dictatorship and law compatible with the tremendous act of self-restraint that is
government under law? 10 Transition away from authoritarianism, as well as the
development of stable federal relations, hinged on that choice.
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Vladimir Putin's reforms can be divided into three categories. The first reform,
the establishment of federal districts and presidential envoys, reshaped the
geographic space of federal politics. The second reform was in fact a reassertion
of existing powers: Putin seized on presidential authority, left virtually unused
by Yeltsin, to suspend the decrees of five regional executives and place Chechnya
under direct presidential control. At the same time - some have suggested
operating under political pressure - the Constitutional Court issued two
sweeping rulings that re-stated its deeply pro-centralising philosophy of
federalism and declared the constitutions of seven republics to be riddled with
fundamental violations of the federal Constitution. Putin commenced a
program, more stick than carrot, of establishing his executive 'power vertical'
over the regions, demanding the 'harmonisation' of their laws and constitutions
with federal law and the federal constitution. His disinterest in revisiting bilateral
treaties was palpable. Third, Putin successfully reshaped the FC and strengthened
his 'executive vertical' powers with a summer legislative package.

Presidential Envoys and Federal districts
The first salvo in Putin's federal reforms was fired less than a week after Putin
swore his oath of office. On 13 May 2000, Putin signed a presidential decree on
• . 'The Plenipotentiary Representative of the President in a Federal District:' 11
The decree and accompanying regulations (polozhenie) divided Russia into seven
federal districts. These districts coincided with existing military districts. Yeltsin's
eighty-nine presidential representatives - one for each subject of the Federation
•·•••""·were replaced by the heads of these new districts; officially termed
'plenipotentiaries' (polnomochnye predstaviteli, or polpredy for short), they were
·~ore commonly called 'presidential envoys; or less favorably, 'namestniki;
.,referring to the tsarist 'governors-general' established by Catherine the Great. 12
.According to the decree, these polpredy were officially part of the Administration
pf the President (the Main Control Directorate - GKU), and charged with
?verseeing the President's constitutional authority in the districts. The
Presidential decree and resolution were cryptically vague regarding specific
d_uties, powers and limitations of this new office.13
.·. District capitals were chosen to deflate the leadership pretensions of the most
owerful regions. In the Volga district, which included such powerhouses as
atarstan and Bashkortostan, the seat of power became Nizhnii Novgorod (not
azau or Ufa, the respective capitals of these republics), the power base of its
plenipotentiary, Sergei Kirienko. In no case was a district capital located in
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a republic. While Moscow, St. Petersburg and Ekaterinburg seemed inevitable
choices, Khabarovsk, Rostov on Don and Novosibirsk appeared to be chosen
to reshape the balance of power.
The decree surprised analysts and regional elites alike. 14 No one expected
federal reform to be Putin's first project. Putin asserted that his decree, designed
to strengthen state unity, was supported by'governors, deputies and all citizens
of Russia. It is possible to say, that in the country, for the first time, there is no
disagreement about the question of principle: 1s His hyperbole could be excused.
Few openly challenged the new president, who rode a wave of popularity not
possessed by a high federal official since the early 1990s. Governors publicly
endorsed the decree, though many no doubt grumbled in private. 16 By
announcing the creation of districts without announcing who would be envoys,
Putin left governors in a tactical dilemma: wondering whether they themselves
or officials they controlled might be appointed (or at least host the district
capital), his critics bit their tongues. 17 Pointing to the legal anarchy that had
been the method and the misery of Yeltsin's presidency, Putin declared, 'It is
seemingly isolated instances like these, drop by drop, that give rise to separatism,
which sometimes becomes the springboard for an even more dangerous evil international terrorism: 18 Who dared oppose such logic behind the 'dictatorship
oflaw'?
Boris Nemtsov, a former governor and leader of the Union of Right Forces,
was among the first to recognise the key to the decrees: '[E]verything namely
depends on which figures appear in these posts. It may be that they are just
run-of-the-mill bureaucrats, and then the whole new system you will call none
other than decorative.' 19 Putin's choices indicated his resolve: five of the seven
polpredy held the rank of general in the armed forces. 20 Who polpredy appointed
as deputies was almost as telling as the selection by Putin of the polpredy
themselves. It was, perhaps, predictable that the civilian-politicians would gather
different types of deputies than their colleagues plucked from military positions.
The entourage of Sergei Kirienko, undoubtedly, was the most professionally
trained, including such well-known and respected advisors as Vladimir Zorin. 21
The first few months under the new system of federal districts led some to
suspect that the polpredy, like Yeltsin's envoys, were paper tigers. The combative
governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast, Eduard Rossel, defiantly went on vacation rather
than greet Petr Latyshev, arriving in Ekaterinburg to introduce himself to the
governors of his district. Some polpredy found it difficult to acquire offices or
even living space. 22 Although numerous press conferences and considerable
media exposure were given to tl1e seven polpredy, work on the ground appeared
to be no more substantial than under the previous system. Criticism grew that
the reform was in fact illusory: just another layer of federal bureaucracy.
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By Fall 2000, however, there were increasing indications that the reform might
have a bite to match its bark. Polpredy were made full members of the Security
Council. Julie A. Corwin, analyzing reports from several newspapers, noted
that polpredy topped the pay scale of federal officials, earning more than four
times the salary of Putin himself! 23 According to Sergei Samoilov, then chief of
the Main Territorial Department of the Administration of the President,
polpredy ranked close to a deputy prime minister in the hierarchy of power. 24
As polpredy and their federal inspectors set to the task of creating a 'unified
legal space' in the federation, scouring regional constitutions, bilateral treaties
and laws for conformity or violation of federal norms, Putin strengthened their
political power by tasking them with the creation of a 'single information space'
as well. A presidential ukaz in late September stripped regional elites of the
right to nominate regional directors of Russian state-owned radio and television stations. From now on, his envoys would make the recommendations. 25 In
the Southern Federal District, Viktor Kazantsev established what most observers
called a 'District Government; a Territorial Collegium bringing together district
representatives of all federal ministries and agencies (excepting the federal
procuracy). 26 All districts soon followed such developments with the creation
of 'security councils' comprised of the regional executives in each district,
mirroring the larger State Council that Putin had decreed at the federal level to
win regional acquiescence to his reform of the FC. Circumstantial proof of the
increasing anxiety of governors about the strengthening of polpredy was the
proposal of Egor Stroev, Speaker in the FC and Governor of Orenburg Oblast,
for a law that would delimit the role and powers of polpredy.27 Conflicts between
the Main Territorial Department and the polpredy led Putin to trim the powers
of both sides in late December (the former appeared to lose considerable power
over regional staff and access to the president), subordinate polpredy to the
control of Aleksandr Voloshin, Chief of the Presidential Administration, with
an ukaz at the end of January 2001, and dismiss Samoilov in February. 28 Eight
months later, in October, the Ministry for Federation Affairs, Nationality, and
Migration Policy was abolished and its head, Aleksandr Blokhin, dismissed.
Few analysts doubted that Putin had accomplished what Yeltsin could not: for
the first time since the 'War of Laws' had begun, the federal government had
the clear upper hand.
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The Quasi-Judicial Power of Presidential Decrees
Although the federal districts signaled the groundbreaking stage of Putin's
efforts at federal reform, it was not the first stage. 'Above everything else, the
state is the law; Putin exclaimed in his address to the nation introducing his
reforms. Putin claimed that more than 20% of regional legislation was
unconstitutional - and swore to combat it. 29
Eight days prior to naming his polpredy, Putin, by his own decree, suspended
the legal force of a decree made by the president of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev,
and a resolution by the Ingush Government. 30 The Ingush president's decree,
nearly 2 112 years old, improved collection of gas and electric payments in the
republic; the government resolution, executing a nearly three-year-old decree
of the Ingush president, involved licenses to foreign workers. These regional
acts, Putin's decree asserted, violated the Constitution, federal law and the federal
tax code. That same day, Putin issued another decree suspending a nearly yearold resolution by the governor of Amur Oblast that permitted Russian citizens
access to a bordering Chinese trading complex. 31 ITAR-TASS reported that an
additional fifteen such decrees were expected soon, on advice from the
Procurator-General. 32 Two days after his decree on the new federal districts,
Putin decreed the suspension of a two-year-old resolution made by the governor
of Smolensk Oblast that established levies for transport-related environmental
contamination. 33 According to Putin's decree, this contradicted two federal laws
and a resolution of the federal government. More decrees suspending regional
legal acts soon followed: against Adygeia, on 7 June; Tver on 12 June; Tula on
12 August; Ingushetia on I September; and Adygeia again on 9 September. 34
This was Putin's first expression of the refrain of his federal reforms, the
strengthening of the president's 'vertical powers' in the Federation. Putin based
these powers on four articles of the federal Constitution. Article 90 gives the
president expansive powers to enact gap-filling decrees and orders (rasporiazheniia) on any subject not otherwise prohibited by or contradicting the Constitution and/or federal law. 35 Putin's decrees, however, were of a special type made
in reliance on a relatively untested article of the Constitution: Article 85, § 2.
Pending ultimate resolution of the issue by an appropriate court, the federal
executive has the power to suspend the acts of executive organs of state power
on all levels of government for violation of the Constitution, federal law or
presidential decrees. 36 This quasi-judicial power is the practical expression of
the authority expressed in two other articles: Article 77, § 2 and Article 80, § 2.
The former provides the specific philosophical backing for the 'vertical power:
providing that 'federal organs of executive power and the organs of executive
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power of the subjects of the RF shall form a unified system of executive power in
the Russian Federation.' The latter article names the president as 'guarantor of
the Constitution of the RF: Neither the legislative nor the judicial branch of
the federal government is given that powerfully symbolic - and vague authority.
Together, these articles give the president extraordinary implicit powers well
beyond those powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and which
have led some political scientists to label the Russian system one of 'superpresidentialism: As Danilenko and Burnham, two respected legal scholars, have
noted, 'Although the Constitution does not place the President above the three
main branches of government, some commentators argue that he may act (as
the French President does) as 'an arbiter' among the legislative, executive and
judicial branches of government.' 37
Although the Constitutional Court has ruled that the President has the
constitutional power to issue temporary decrees to fill gaps in federal law, the
opinion was not unanimous. 38 As Justice Luchin noted in a powerful dissent:
This 'self-regulation,' not knowing any kind of limitation, is dangerous and
incompatible with the principle of the division of powers and other values of a ruleof-law state. The President may not decide any kind of questions if they do not flow
from his authority as provided in the Constitution. He is not able to lean on his socalled 'latent (implied)' authorities. Use of them in the absence of a stable constitutional
legal order or legality is fraught with negative consequences: the weakening of the
mechanism of checks and balances, the strengthening of one branch of power at the
expense of another, the beginning of confrontation between them. 39

While lacunae in federal law are a serious problem and revision of certain parts
of the federal constitution is obviously important, caution must be taken not
to further aggravate existing problems. The federal executive's power to suspend
acts of regional executive branches is an extraordinary encroachment on two
core features of federal government. First, it fundamentally weakens the
distinction between federal and regional government. No proponent of sustainable federal government in Russia could sensibly advocate further decentralisation of authority, but care must be taken not to fall victim to the dangers of
over-centralisation of power in Russia in response to this debilitating deflation
of federal power. This is precisely the view Putin advocates in his appeal for the
'strengthening of the vertical' of executive power. All executive branches, at
every level of government, would fall subject to the will of the federal executive
branch. Second, having weakened the separation of powers between federal
government and the constituent subjects of the federation, Article 85 encroaches
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on the division of powers between the executive branch and the judicial branch
of government, on all levels. The president, by suspending the legal force of a
decree or resolution of a different executive authority, undertakes an act of
legal judgement that the Russian Constitution accords, rightly, the judicial
branch. While suspensive decrees may ultimately be overruled by'an appropriate
court; the initial judgement of (and penalty for) unconstitutionality is made,
not by the court, but by the executive. That judgement, lodged in tersely worded
decrees is extremely conclusory: no explanation or rationale is provided. Even
the institution of the procuracy does not have the authority to pronounce on
the constitutionality of an act before resolution in the courts.
One month after Putin's initial reform package, the federal Constitutional
Court issued an opinion (opredelenie) on the constitutions of Adygeia, Bashkortostan, Ingushetia, Komi, North Ossetia and Tatarstan that further strengthened
the president's 'power vertical.' 40 This highly critical document rejected the
claims to sovereignty (several of which bordered on the doctrine of nullification)
repeatedly made by these republics. The supremacy of the federal Constitution
was (again) reasserted over all other constitutions and charters, including those
predating the 1993 federal Constitution.41 The 'treaty-constitutional' federalism
favoured by the regions was categorically rejected. This opinion specifically
noted tllat subjects of the Federation
... may not change the priorities established by the Constitution of the Russian
Federation for the action of laws and other federal normative legal acts, limit their
application, suspend their activity, or introduce any kind of procedures or mechanisms
for the settlement of legal conflicts that constrain the action of these acts that is not
foreseen by the Constitution of the Russian Federation or by federal laws.42

In other words, while the Federal President possessed the power to suspend
regional executive acts deemed by him to conflict with the federal Constitution
prior to any judicial determination of that fact, regional elites did not possess a
parallel power to suspend federal acts deemed by them to be in conflict with
the federal Constitution. For those who saw executive political pressure behind
pronouncements of the Court, 43 this opinion signalled that a battle of decrees
would not be tolerated. Only the federal president had that power.
Another Constitutional Court decision (postanovlenie) against the Republic
of Altai, announced a few days earlier, held that republic's constitution to be
riddled with violations of federal law, especially regarding sovereignty. According
to the Court:
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The Constitution of the Russian Federation binds the sovereignty of the Russian
Federation, its constitutional-legal status and authority, and also the constitutionallegal status and authority of the republics that compose the Russian Federation, not
by their will on the basis of a treaty, but by the will of the multi-national Russian
people - the carriers and sole source of power in the Russian Federation, which,
realising the principles of equality under the law and the self-determination of peoples,
constitutes the rebirth of Russia's sovereign statehood as a historically fully developed
state entity in its present federal structure [... ] Recognition then of sovereignty for
republics, when all other subjects of the Russian Federation do not possess it, would
violate the constitutional equality under the law of subjects of the Russian Federation;
its realisation is made impossible in principle, in so far as subjects of the Russian
Federation, not possessing sovereignty, by their own status may not be equal under
the law with sovereign states. 44

Large portions of this ruling were reprinted verbatim in the Constitutional
Court's opinion later that month. It foreshadowed with one republic the
sweeping denunciation of regional claims to sovereignty made subsequently
against six others and, by implication, all republics. The rulings of the Court a court of discretionary jurisdiction - at such a charged moment in Russian
federal politics was considered by some to be more political warning than legal
ruling. Putin's representative to the Court, Mikhail Mitiukov, asserted that the
Altai decision
gives a juridical stamp to the initiatives of the President ... [for] the strengthening of a
federal state and guarantees of the conformity of regional legislation to federal law....
The essence of this document, in my view, is that it puts an end to the so-called ideology
of sovereignisation of the subjects of the Federation. Their sovereignty is not
boundless.' 45

Not all regional observers shared this view. A senior official of the Permanent
Mission of the Republic of Bashkortostan in Moscow observed shortly after
the decision: 'In Russia, the political process is more important than the law
itself. So the agreements of our president with the RF president are more
important than the law. The Constitutional Court of Russia is just a body, highly
respected, but just a body of the RF. It has nothing to do with the Republic of
Bashkortostan - we have our own Constitutional Court: 46 In Tatarstan, Tatar
nationalists presented that republic's parliament and president with a bill
declaring the decision invalid on its territory. 47
That attitude would radically change as the presidential envoys flexed their
inuscles and Putin's other proposals became federal law. Putin's decrees quickly
captured the attention of regional executives, who leapt to amend controverted
laws and decrees and, in some cases, even constitutions. Days after the opinion
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of the Constitutional Court was delivered, the republic of Tuva, neither named
in the cases before the Constitutional Court nor targeted by Putin's executive
decrees, announced the completion of a massive amendment of its constitution.48 In Kalmykia, President Kirsan Iliumzhinov announced the total compliance of his republic with federal law. 49
In less than two months, Putin and the Court had threatened the constitutionality of legal activity in a dozen subjects of the Federation, eight of which
were republics. 50 Extension of the 'executive power vertical' would not stop
there. In conjunction with Putin's next wave oflegislative reforms, soon all the
republics and regions of the RF would be pressed by Putin's presidential envoys,
the federal inspectors they appointed, and the procuracy and Ministry of Justice
to bring their laws and government activity into conformity with federal norms.
In September 2001, a new federal presidential commission charged with the
(seemingly perennial) task of demarcating federal and regional authority,
intensified scrutiny of bilateral treaties. With over two score treaties and more
than 500 agreements still considered valid by at least one of the signatorygovernments to them, the Kremlin announced a deadline: there would be a
'unified constitutional space' in the RF by 24 July 2002. 51 Just how bilateral
treaties, which had taken years to negotiate, would be unraveled in a few months
was not dear. Since treaties had never been ratified, one Kremlin official declared
them to occupy the bottom rung of the hierarchy of law; presumably, there
would be no problem, then, in discarding them. 52 This was, of course, always
the great risk carried by these documents, the product of highly personalised
political relations unsupported by ratification or other procedures that would
have strengthened their legal force.
There is, however, some risk to the steady stream of cancelled decrees, judicial
determinations, sabre-rattling commissions and strict deadlines. To be sure,
from the point of view of a transition to democracy, many of the regional decrees
that Putin suspended were dear abuses of power. Many of these presidents and
governors have had little interest in the development of democratic structures
beyond the Potemkin villages they construct in (often futile) attempts to attract
investment. But, from the point of view of federal development, Putin's cure
seemed at times to risk side-effects as unappealing as the disease. In an attempt
to deal with long-term violations of the law, Putin sought to solve the problem
through his 'dictatorship oflaw.' But would his dictatorship know when to stop?
Or, a victim of their own successes, would federal authorities continue to
strengthen the 'executive vertical' with ever increasing centralisation of
authority?
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Putin's legislative Reforms
Having established his federal districts in mid-May, sweeping legislative reforms
followed in June. Putin sought the following: first, to oust regional executives
and parliament chairmen from their dual positions as members of the upper
chamber of the Federal Assembly, the FC; and second, having weakened their
influence on federal lawmaking (and removed their senatorial immunity from
prosecution), to force regional laws and lawmakers into conformity with federal
norms by threat of dismissal from their regional positions for repeated
malfeasance. 53 The FC, predictably, refused to drink the hemlock that Putin
offered. Nor was it willing to permit federal condemnation of regional politicians
(who, if the first reform succeeded in removing their immunity as senators,
could well include themselves). While, in the latter case, the Duma was able to
override (with the required two-thirds majority) the upper chamber's veto, a
special conciliation commission had to be established to pass a substantially
amended FC reform: the hemlock was sweetened and its drinking postponed.
Putin achieved his objectives through a combination of strong political pressure
(his public approval ratings were at record levels) and a willingness to offer the
occasional political compromise. A third 'reform' - extending to regional elites
a power to dismiss local self-government officials that paralleled the power
Putin would hold over regional executives and legislatures -provoked comparatively less controversy. It was, and was widely held to be, a sop to regional power
aimed to make passage of Putin's other reforms more palatable. Putin's new
power to dismiss regional executives and legislatures was circumscribed in most
cases by the multi-staged involvement of the judiciary. When the dust had
cleared, however, Putin's presidential powers had grown significantly and federal
authority, if not immediately strengthened, had been positioned to reassert
itself on a new political playing field.
Putin understood that his fundamental changes could not be enacted by
presidential decree. At the very least, these reforms required legislative action.
Some critics argued that even promulgation as federal laws was inadequate for
the scale of the reforms proposed - constitutional amendment was needed. In
the end, Putin succeeded in winning support in the legislative branch both for
the substance of his reforms and for the sufficiency of ordinary law for their
adoption.
Putin's apparent victory in the Federal Assembly presents serious problems
of executive overreach, threatening an already fragile balance of powers (not
only between branches of government but also between federal and regional
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levels of government). On the eve of the introduction of his reforms, Putin
shared his objectives on national television: 'The general aim of these draft
laws is to make both the executive and legislative power really work, bring a
true meaning to the constitutional principle of division between the two
branches of power and consolidate the vertical structure of executive power.' 54
Putin's Orwellian 'true meaning' of the separation of powers meant
'consolidation' and a 'vertical' executive power extending from the Moscow
Kremlin to local organs of self-government! As one respected legal scholar
observed, Putin's federal reforms 'unwittingly unleashed a war; the resolution
of which would neither be quick or predictable. 55

Reform No 1: Perestroika at the FC
The first and most dramatic reform on Putin's agenda was the perestroika
(restructuring) of the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly, the FC. The
Russian parliament is a bicameral legislature: 450 deputies sit in the lower
chamber (the Duma); in the upper chamber (the FC) sit 178 senators. Virtually
all federal systems operate bicameral systems, 56 and it is not difficult to understand why. The sometimes competing, sometimes complementary impulses of
federalism in a polity naturally suggest more than one collection of lawmakers
who, although chosen according to different principles of representation, are
united under one legislative roof. Both houses are required to make law. Madison famously outlined the benefits of an upper chamber in The Federalist Papers,
N.62: as an 'impediment ... against improper acts oflegislation' by passing bills
twice through deliberative bodies organized to represent different interests; the
senate also acts as a shield against 'the impulse of sudden and violent passions,
... seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions: A
bicameral legislature acts as a bulwark against what Tsebelis and Money have
described as three tyrannies: Publius' classic protection against a 'tyranny of
tl1e majority' in the veto one chamber holds vis-a-vis tl1e other; protection
against a 'tyranny of the minority' by demanding a more complex assent to
legislation than a simple, unicameral majority; 57 finally, protection against the
'tyranny of the individual; who by tl1e power to set an agenda can control the
outcome, made more difficult because of the plurality of agendas. 58
Since 1995, tl1e Council had been comprised of senators sitting ex officio:
the respective head of the executive branch (president or governor) and
legislative branch (speaker or chairman) of each region. 59 This was not always
the case. The RF's first legislature was the Supreme Soviet, a holdover from the
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(then still existing) Soviet Union. This body was constituted from am uch larger
Congress of People's Deputies, directly elected for the first time in March 1990.
Boris Yeltsin was elected chairman of the new Parliament and quickly fostered
its self-image as a populist body demanding ever-increasing powers from
Gorbachev's central authority. A year later, when Yeltsin traded his post as head
of the legislative branch to become Russia's first President, he was himself forced
to confront the riotous legislature he had created. A paralysing conflict between
Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet resulted in the October 1993 storming of the
White House, the Parliament's home, and adoption ofYeltsin's new Constitution,
which established a bicameral legislature. The FC was directly elected in its
entirety in 1993, with two seats chosen (and rarely more than two or three
candidates to choose from) on a first-past-the-post basis for each of the eightynine constituencies. Interestingly, however, Yeltsin's Constitution did not
explicitly demand election of the upper chamber, as it did for the lower chamber
(the Duma) of the Federal Assembly. The 'manner of formation' of the FC was
left to be established by federal law. 60 With much effort, and only after the
Duma overrode the veto of its sister chamber, a new law established the ex
officio scheme of appointment employed from 1995 until 2000. 61
Initially, the bargain must have seemed irresistible to Yeltsin. Having forcefully
dispatched his enemies in the old parliament, Yeltsin's new law filled the upper
chamber with a majority of men who owed their regional positions to
appointment by him. He also hoped for a less cantankerous body of lawmakers,
who by the very nature of their dual appointment would behave more like a
part-time legislature. The perks of office (e.g. apartments in Moscow) controlled
by the Kremlin's state property administration further ensured a more passive
upper chamber. As Yeltsin soon learned, however, he could not buy the love of
the FC. As more and more governors and republican presidents won election to
their regional executive positions, their allegiance to Yeltsin waned. Local
constituencies gave regional elites the luxury of characterising the centre as stingy
adversary, in much the same manner that Yeltsin had attacked Gorbachev. No
longer beholden to their patron, governors and presidents took seriously their
roles as senators, sometimes to the visible frustration of President Yeltsin.
Putin immediately recognized the problem such a chamber posed for his
efforts to strengthen federal executive power. Any attempt to weaken regional
autonomy or limit regional jurisdiction would be opposed by senators whose
Personal power was decreased. Efforts to force out of office the most recalcitrant
~nd rebellious governors and presidents would by stymied by the senatorial
llllmunity from prosecution regional executives enjoyed. Reform would have
to be multi-staged, beginning with a change of faces. 62
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The initial proposal from the Kremlin was draconian: senators were to be
elected by each region's legislature. Although the regional executive had the
power to nominate his representative, the advice and consent of the regional .
legislature was required for both senatorial appointments. The post of senator •
was explicitly defined as a 'professional-permanent' position, which meant that
members of the Federal Duma, regional legislatures, and local self-government,
elected state or municipal officials and 'category!\. state officials were expressly
prohibited from service. Election of new senators to the reformed upper
chamber would be completed no later than 1 April 2001. Regional heads of
executive and legislative branches would enjoy, at most, a nine-month grace
period of immunities and privileges.
As expected, the FC expressed strong opposition, voting 129-13 against
reform. 63 The Duma, therefore, became a critical player, where 300 votes (out
of 450 deputies) would be required to override the upper chamber's veto. 64
Although Putin had achieved tl1is support in the Duma's first three votes, his
margin was extremely narrow. He was quick to signal that his bill was not written
in stone; he was willing to compromise. 65 Senators could remain in office for
the full length of their terms - January 1, 2002 at the very latest - in what was
termed a 'soft rotation' from power. A joint conciliatory commission of senators
and Duma deputies hammered out further compromises, though it worked
under the shadow of the Duma's override powers. 66 Under pressure, the commission took less than a fortnight to arrive at a compromise: senatorial appointments by regional executives would stand unless their legislatures rejected the
candidate by a special majority. Regional executives could, with the same limitation, recall their representative. With these additional amendments, and the
Duma's super-majority a sword of Damocles hanging over their heads, the
Senators accepted the reform as a fait accompli. 67
From the point of view of Putin's efforts to strengthen federal authority, reform
of the FC was obviously important. Most crucially, Putin removed regional elites
from their dual posts as federal senators without serious revolt, stripping them in
the process both of immunity against federal prosecution and influence over
federal policy-making. Many observers feared that this was only the first step in a
process that would strip the Council of its competences, reducing an important
check on both the executive branch and the lower chamber of the Parliament as
well. Some, viewing Putin's reforms as a complete package, saw sinister connections
between the reformation of the upper chamb~r and the creation of governorsgeneral, transforming federal governance into an executive capped pyramid. 68
Egor Stroev, Chairman of the FC, expressed his fear that Putin's so-called reform
was the first stage in the 'dismantling' of the upper chamber; the result, he warned,
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would weaken the parliament as a federal representative organ for regional
interests, and thus, the prospects for federalism and democracy in Russia: 'there
will result a serious weakening of the federal bases of Russian statehood, for a
democratic federation with a unicameral parliament is nonsense.' 69 One
outspoken critic of the reform in the FC, President of Chuvashia Nikolai Fedorov,
threatened to challenge the reform in the Constitutional Court, contending that
'all honest lawyers admit that these reforms and laws are essentially revising the
existing constitutional structure of the RF ... ' 70
In an effort to appease the soon-to-be ex-senators, Putin created a new forum
in which they could sit. In early September 2000, as he had hinted throughout
the summer, Putin formed a 'State Council: 71 This body was directly subordinated to the executive branch, having been created by presidential decree. 72 Its
composition included all eighty-nine regional executives. A smaller presidium
comprised of the seven regional executives chosen by the President on a sixmonth rotating basis, ensured that the reform would be tempered with the
promise of the president's ear. 73 At its first meeting the Presidium established
for itself monthly meetings with the president, while the Council would meet
in plenary sessions only four times a year. While Putin made assurances that
the State Council was merely an advisory body (though given the president's
extensive decree powers, such a role was not to be downplayed) some suggested
that its establishment presaged a transfer of competence from the FC, a move
that virtually all critical analysts agreed would require constitutional amendment.74
Beyond the substantive questions of competences and personnel, reform of
the FC raised procedural questions that touched not only on federal
development, but on the transition from authoritarianism. An optimist would
contend that Russia's constitutional system had functioned well: following the
legitimate legislative initiative of a new president, disagreement in the legislative
branch was expeditiously resolved in a conciliatory commission, compromise
legislation worked out, and a law passed by large majorities in botl1 houses.
Threats to take the political battle to the Constitutional Court quickly lost
support. 75 On the other hand, the pressure placed on the FC, operating under
the shadow of the Duma's super-majority and the untested rule-of-law
credentials of Vladimir Putin, meant that conciliation on such an issue was
hardly genuine. Senators accepted the reforms grudgingly, still under the threat
of a Duma override, and with the feeling that they had little choice but to accede
to the demands of a powerful new president.
Implementation of the reform of the FC moved slowly. Under the compromise known as the 'soft rotation,' regional executives and chairs of regional
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legislatures sitting ex officio in the FC had until 1 January 2002 to comply with:
the new law. According to the FC website, as of 2 November 2001, only 85
senators (of 178) were working in the FC on a 'permanent' basis, as prescribed
by the new law. 76 Only fifteen of these new members were from republics. 77 In
nine republics, no changeover had been accomplished at all. In only three
republics (Marii El, Udmurtia, and Khakassia) had both senators been newly
selected according to the law.

Reform No 2: Federal Influence over Regional Legislatures and
Executives
Regional executive and legislative branches of government were also targets of
reform from above. Putin wanted to install the mechanisms that would give
him real power according to his formula for 'strengthening of the executive
vertical.' His draft legislation amended a 1999 law that had attempted to
standardise baseline principles for regional legislative and executive structures
(e.g. maximum lengths oflegislative terms, deputies' immunities, use of official
seals, procedural regularity, etc.), often merely by repetition or elaboration of
principles set in the Constitution (e.g. elections, jurisdictional competences,
guarantee of control by legislatures of expenses required for their operation,
etc.). 78 Among its most significant provisions, Yeltsin's old law appears to have
outlawed the not uncommon republican practice of permitting members of
republican legislatures simultaneously to hold official positions as executive
heads oflocal administrations (a post akin to mayor of a district) -though this
prohibition has been observed mainly in the breach by the republics. 79
Putin amended this law to give the federal executive the power to dismiss
regional legislatures and executives for extended and/or gross violations of
federal law. The actual legislation, however, was less extreme than what had
been imagined, thanks mainly to the cumbersome and lengthy procedure
through which this power could be realised. Although the law gave the president
a considerable power to threaten regional politicians with dismissal, the law's
procedures - if followed as outlined in the law - provided numerous opportunities over a long period of time and multiple stages of action by which those
threatened could avoid fulfilment of the threat. Legislatures and executives were
given six months to put their legal houses in order, after which time normative
legal acts recognised by courts to contradict federal law would be susceptible to
the provisions of the new law. 80
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The involvement of multiple authorities and deliberately long periods for
compliance limit the severity of this reform. The strongest potential bulwark
against abuse of this new power, however, is the involvement of the judicial
branch at the initial stages of the process. The judiciary has a role to play as
shield against the executive's sword and against the legislature's purse, and is
an invaluable institution of the rule-of-law for democracies. The authority of
the court to demand the rational use of power - to demand reasons behind
executive action - and to command adherence by political actors to legal
principles (in other words, to establish and protect Cass Sunstein's 'republic of
reasons' in a deliberative democracy) is extraordinarily important. Though
predictions are always hazardous, the role of the judiciary in this process may
well turn out to be what preserves the legal integrity - and prevents the
capricious use of - this new law.
Nevertheless, a grant of power to the federal executive to initiate a process of
dismissal of popularly elected officials and even whole legislatures for derogation
from the constitutional order is an extraordinary authority in a federal system.
By 'strengthening the vertical of executive power,' this law emasculates the
separation of powers between the federal and regional governments. Regional
executives receive their mandate to govern in popular elections, not by commission from the federal executive. To subject them to discharge - either by the
initiative of a federal executive ukaz or, worse, on the mere accusation (not, it
must be emphasised, upon conviction) by the federal Procurator-General- is
as much a threat to the separation between regional and federal administration
as it is to the political life of the official. Regional legislatures also receive,
collectively, an electoral mandate that is entirely separate from that of the federal
legislature that is now empowered to dissolve them, impliedly on a theory of
collective culpability of all deputies for violating as a body the constitutional
order. Those deputies who vote 'correctly' are not saved from the fate that awaits
their stubborn colleagues.
This is not to say that violation of the supremacy of the federal Constitution
or federal law is tolerable;81 nor does it diminish the flagrant disregard for federal
legal authority that has been the rule and not the exception in post-Soviet Russia.
These dangers (in the form of philosophies of state sovereignty and 'treatyconstitutional' conceptions of the federal compact, support for the principle of
nullification, secessionism, or simple nonfeasance) have been recurring themes
of post-Soviet regional politics. But the powers granted the federal authorities
by this reform are so extreme on the continuum of federal systems as to be
virtually off the register.
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An underlying acceptance of the role of the rule of law (and by extension
courts in general) as a neutral arbiter, rather than political weapon, is profoundly
lacking in Putin's reforms. The destructive double legacy of Soviet conceptions
of law as a political tool or weapon and federalism as a mere administrative
device for centralisation, is glaringly apparent in the perceived need for federal
dismissal of regionally elected officials and legislatures. The experience of other
federations has generally led to an acceptance, even in the most politically
charged moments, of the rule of law (interpreted by courts of law) as the
unshakeable bedrock for the 'rules of the game.' In the United States, for example,
dismissal of state officials by federal authorities (either executive or legislative)
for violation of the federal constitution is simply unimaginable. 82 While it was
conceivable that a federal executive could enforce Supreme Court-ordered
integration of public schools in the 1950s, for example, there could be no serious
discussion of a federally-sponsored eviction of elected state governors who, in
every imaginable way, sought to defy the Court, the Congress and the
President. 83 Nor was there room to imagine that the angry legislative resolutions
passed by many southern states reacting against the opinion of the Court could
be grounds for federally ordered dissolution of those elected bodies. The Court,
and the country as a federal system, relied on the authority of the judiciary
(remarkably, even when federal relations were at their most strained) to declare
the rule for all and leave to the executive branch its enforcement.
There are still other considerable grounds for serious concerns about abuse
of presidential discretion. The rather vague power of the President to
temporarily discharge regional executives is extremely severe. 84 Only an
accusation (not a conviction, or even a scheduled trial) is required for exercise
of this power. An order by an 'appropriate' court is not required at any stage of
its use. Nothing is said about what stage in the criminal investigative process
the 'temporary' discharge terminates. Given that the period of time between
accusation and trial can extend to years (and that, even following an acquittal,
re-investigation and re-trial is permitted by the Constitution), a regional
executive may be confronted with an interminable 'temporary' suspension from
office. Furthermore, no limitations are put on the exercise of this power, for
example, in the final days of a gubernatorial election, or even to disqualify an
incumbent executive as a candidate in the next elections. The new law does not
specify what constitutes a 'grave' or 'especially grave' crime. There is also no
built-in waiting period for the exercise of this power, as adopted for the other
mechanisms for dismissal provided in this law. This is the power that regional
executives truly feared, 85 especially as their senatorial immunities were taken
away by the law on the Federal Assembly. 86
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Reform No 3: Federal Influence over Local Self-Government
As noted above, Yeltsin rapidly lost the power to appoint and dismiss regional
executives as increasing numbers of regional politicians won popular mandates
in open (if not always contested) elections. This was not the case for the
relationship between regional executives and the heads oflocal self-government,
the lowest level of government in the regions. In many cases, heads of local
self-government were appointed by the executive, responsive (because
responsible) to their political patrons rather than to political parties or the
electorate. Oftentimes, heads oflocal executive administrations served ex officio
as deputies in regional legislatures, according to the same formula by which
the FC had formerly been composed. When these local executives owed their
posts to the governor or president of the region, the result was a flagrant violation
of the principle of separation of powers. As noted above, this practice was
outlawed in the Yeltsin administration, though compliance seems to have been
negligible in the absence of strong enforcement.
Putin sought to change this practice, again by submitting a Yeltsin-era law
to amendment.87 These amendments did to local self-government what Putin's
strengthening of the executive vertical did to the relationship between the federal
executive branch and the executive and legislative branches of regional
governments. 88 Upon a finding by a court (which court is unspecified) that a
normative legal act promulgated by a local representative or administrative
body contradicts either federal or regional laws, or otherwise amounts to a
'violation (disparagement)' of human or civil rights 'or offensive of another
injury; those organs are required to revoke the act and publish the ruling of the
court. In the event of non-compliance with the judicial order, the representative
organ is subject to dismissal and the head of the administrative body subject to
early discharge from duty. The procedure for discharge is also similar, although
the required preliminary written warning could come either from the initiative
of the regional legislature (to warn the local representative organ), or by the
regional executive (to warn both the representative and executive local organs).
Following issuance of the warning, the local organs at risk of dismissal have
one month to comply with the original court order; after that time, but within
six months of the court order, the local representative body may be dismissed
by the regional legislature (by passage of a law), and the local executive body
l11ay be dismissed by the regional executive (by issuance of an ukaz). If the
regional power lay dormant, three months after the court order the President
of the RF may introduce legislation to the State Duma to dismiss the
representative organ, and on his own authority dismiss the local executive. New
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elections would be triggered immediately by any dismissals. 89 As before, courts
have the ultimate authority to review dismissals (where citizens who could claim
that the dismissal worked a violation of their rights or legal interests would
have standing to appeal dismissals). A six-month grace period was established,
as in the other reform, before retroactive enforcement of decisions by courts
on existing violations would commence.
While bracing the procedure for dismissal with judicial orders on either side
could potentially de-politicise disputes by maintaining rule-of-law standards
for judgement oflocal authorities and abuses of administrative discretion, the
new procedure presents several problems as well. The same criticism of Russia's
courts, slowly emerging from their traditional place under the thumb of political
powers, could be laid before this 'reform.' In other governmental systems,
violations of the law by officials of the executive branch result in orders to
comply with law or be impeached. In the United States, impeachment has
predominantly settled on the removal of corrupt judges, although in its original
conception (deeply influenced by the English common law tradition)
impeachment was put forward also as a means to restrain abuses of power by
the chief executive and his appointed officials. 90 Usually, impeachment is by a
legislature (or some part of it) sitting as a court of impeachment. The point is
that the procedure is a judicial one, with all the attendant safeguards and rules
of evidence. Under Putin's law, impeachment is by decree of the next higher
executive in the chain of command.
Another problem is the use of a power to dissolve legislatures as an impeaching device. 'Aggrandisement of the legislative at the expense of the other
departments' was a serious enough concern for James Madison to devote several
articles of The Federalist Papers to its attention. 91 But his solutions - bicameralism, an executive veto, and the competing interests of different constituencies
in a 'compound republic,' i.e. federalism itself - did not include the power of
the executive and judicial branches to discharge the legislative branch from
power.92 The legislature, as a body, was not subject to discharge by the executive,
even if it passed legislation declared by the Supreme Court to be in flagrant
and gross violation of the Constitution. The solution to the problem of how to
deal with a recalcitrant parliament that persisted .in passing unconstitutional
legislation was either to rely on popular displeasure at election time or to rely
on the executive branch to refuse to implement the law declared by the judiciary
to be unconstitutional.
The Russian tradition has pointed in the opposite direction, and it is to this
legacy that the source of the idea of prorogation-as-impeachment might be
attributed. One of the most debilitating legacies of the Soviet era has been the
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continued approach to law as a political weapon rather than as an administrative
tool: law is a means to crush opponents when in power, to weaken them when
in opposition. Yeltsin's baptism by parliamentary fire in 1992-1993 showed the
depths to which such thinking could sink. The remedy there was executive
dissolution of the Parliament,93 followed by the use of the military to shell
parliamentary opponents (who themselves had declared the executive power
null and void due to misuse) into submission. Putin has characterised his own
'reforms' as restoration of the vertical executive power, indicating that for him,
autonomy from central control is an aberration to be corrected. 94
Putin's reforms were, more than anything else, a reaction to Yeltsin's federal
legacy of weak federal institutions and lack of consensus on basic questions of
sovereignty and intergovernmental relations in a federal state. Writing while
Putin was still acting president, Vladimir Lysenko, the Deputy Chairman of the
Duma's Committee on Federal and Regional Policies, described a model of
centralisation he called
guided democracy, or a soft authoritarian regime - an attempt to consolidate power
for the completion of economic reforms in the country by way of the creation of a
regime of personal power of the president of the country and the limitation of a number
of democratic institutions and procedures. 95

In many ways, Lysenko's program presaged Putin's federal reforms, including
reform of the FC, reform of the system of presidential representatives, and
strengthening (i.e. centralisation) of the power to enforce the supremacy of
federal legal and economic (including budget and t'!x) systems. This approach,
Lysenko asserted, was already slowly beginning to operate in Russia and should
be encouraged: centralisation of federal power and an even stronger president
were prerequisites for a 'developed democracy; only after which could there be
a return to decentralised federalism. 96
Neither Lysenko nor Putin could provide satisfactory assurances that 'soft
authoritarianism' (in Lysenko's phrase) or 'the dictatorship of law' and the
'strengthening of the vertical of executive federal power'(in Putin's words) would
not be medicine worse than the disease. Is Russia doomed to decide between
an increasingly centralized federal system and a system increasingly at risk of
disintegration, as Riker predicted for all federal systems? On a more nuanced
continuum of federal systems, which direction does Russia face?
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50
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s~riously. Previous 'strict deadlines' had pockmarked the Yeltsin years. The Putin administration had already changed the deadline at least twice. Corwin (200lc).
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time of his announcement, the deadline for legal conformity had again been moved forward.
Corwin (200ld).
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him from his corrupt, personal fiefdom in the Far East, abruptly agreed to resign (despite
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65 Kozyreva (2000a), 1-2.
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light of Putin's reforms began as early as May. See Sukhova (2000a), 1. Hints were also
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of Putin's ukaz). See Kalashnikova - Sukhova (2000), 1.
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Tomsk Oblast Governor Viktor Kress, Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov, Khabarovsk Krai
Governor Viktor Ishaev, Dagestan State Council Chairman Magomedali Magomedov,
Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev, and St. Petersburg Governor Vladimir Iakovlev.
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(2000b ).
74 According to the powerful governor of St. Petersburg and a member of the new Presidium
(and one of Putin's adversaries), Vladimir Iakovlev: 'Our conversations with Mr Putin have
confirmed that in order for the State Council to be legitimate, we have to change the
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76
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78
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See Article 12, § 1.
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81 Oliver Wendell Holmes' famous comment is apropos: 'I do not think the United States
would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think
the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the
several States.' Quoted in Gunther - Sullivan ( 1997), 65.
82 While impeachment has sometimes been used to remove executive officials from office
this function has been rare in the United States. Impeachment has predominantly bee~
used to unseat judges. In either case, this is done by and at the behest of the legislature (not
the executive) sitting as a court of impeachment (not, in principle, as a political body) to
decide a violation of the law of its own jurisdiction (state or federal).
83 Even when, in 1957, Arkansas Governor Orval E. Faubus openly defied court-ordered
school desegregation with the use of Arkansas national guardsmen, his flagrantly
unconstitutional act was not met by then President Eisenhower with efforts to seek his
dismissal. Nor could this have been attempted by the federal Chief Executive against a
state governor with an electoral mandate. Eisenhower responded by calling out U.S. soldiers,
whose forceful presence was used to accomplish the federal courts' orders.
84 Article 29, § 4 of the revised law, N. 184-FZ of 6 October 1999 (explicated in Art. 1, § 6 of
Putin's reform legislation, N.106-FZ of 29 July 2000.
85 The fear may well be justified. One week after the law entered into effect (a six month
delay was built into the law signed 29 July 2000), Putin seemed to have won a prize that
eluded his predecessor for years - the resignation of Primorskii Krai governor Evgenii
Nazdratenko. Though it is unclear whether Putin specifically threatened the governor with
use of this law, its sudden presence in Putin's arsenal of powers certainly was known to all
parties. Filipov (2001), A9. According to Radio Free Europe, the day before Nazdratenko's
resignation (for health reasons many disputed), Putin phoned Nazdratenko, and the head
of the Kremlin's State Control Department, Yevgenii Lisov, personally visited Nazdratenko.
Goble- Corwin (2001).
86 Why wasn't a conciliation commission established to whittle away the harshest features
of this reform, as had been accomplished with the reform of the FC itself? One factor may
have been the different vote tallies in the Duma between the two pieces of legislation.
Article 105, § 5 of the Russian Constitution grants the Duma the power to adopt a federal
law over a FC veto by a vote of two-thirds the total number of the lower chamber's 450
deputies (i.e. 300 deputies). Whereas the third reading of the bill on the composition of
the FC passed in the Duma with only 308 votes, and approval of its compromise version
passed with only 307 votes, the Duma passed the bill on dismissal of regional executives
and legislatures by a solid 361 votes, well over the margin necessary to defeat a veto by the
upper chamber.
87 That law was N.154-FZ, 28 August 1995, 'O obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii mestnogo
samoupravleniia v Rossiiskoi Federatsii; Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, N.35
(1995), item 3506; with amendments found at N.12 (1997), item 1378.
88 This reform was made law by N .107-FZ, 4 August 2000, 'O vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii
v Federal'nyi zakon 'Ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii mestnogo samoupravleniia v
Rossiiskoi Federatsii', Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, N. 32, 7 August 2000,
item 3330, p. 6243.
89 The treatment of heads of municipal administrative organs is exceptional. Regional
executives and the RF President both have power to issue an ukaz of dismissal and to appoint
temporary acting heads of those organs in the interim before elections, unless the charter
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of the municipal prescribed a different procedure. Proposals for dismissal of such officials
by the President of the Russian Federation may be introduced by the legislature of the
region, the regional executive, the RF Government and the RF Procurator-General.
90 Berger (1999), 4-5.
91 See, in particular, N.48, 49 and especially 51.
92 The Federalist, N.51.
''This was the infamous Ukaz N.1400, 21September1993.
94 Addressing the nation on May 17, Putin expounded: 'If the head of a territory can be
dismissed by the country's president under certain circumstances, he should have a similar
right in regard to authorities subordinate to him. Today, this is not just a right thing to do,
but simply necessary in order to restore the functional vertical structure of executive power
in the country. For a long time now the federal parliament, the government and even the
president have not been able to achieve even simple but absolutely necessary things because
they lacked such tools: to observe the citizens' rights and implement Russian state legislation
with equal precision throughout Russia, in its most remote parts as well as in Moscow.
This is what the dictatorship of law means. It would mean we are living in one strong
country, one single state called Russia.'
"This model was expounded as early as February 2000 in an unpublished paper prepared
for Duma and FC working groups. The author is grateful to Mikhail Stolyarov for a copy
of this document. The model was eventually published in early April. Lysenko (2000b ), 8.
96 Lysenko (2000b ), 8. Lysenko argued that the strong president and centralized state he
prescribed for Russia was of a 'European type,' resembling the personal power of Charles
de Gaulle, not some 'central Asian despotic regime.'
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